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ABSTRACT 
Labor  sopply estimates are seositive to the measures of health used. When self reported measures 
are  osed  health seems to  play  a larger role and  economic  factors a smaller one than  whsn more 
objective nsoasures are used. While most authors have  interpreted these results as an indication of 
th" blase's inherent in using self-reported measures, there are reasons  to be suspicious  of  estimates 
based on more objective measures as well. In  this paper I construct a statistical model incorporating 
both self- reported and objective measures of health- I use the nsodei to show the potential biases 
involved  in using i'ither measure of health or in using one to instrument the other.  When outside 
information on  the validity of self-reported measures of health are incorporated into the model 
estimates suggest that the self-reported  measures of  health perform better than many have believed, 
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The majority of men aho retire before the age of 65 report health as the reason  they do so.1 
Though health is, no doubt, an important factor in determining the age at which men retire, there 
are a variety of reasons not  to take these self-reports at face value.  It seems quite plausible that 
men often rationalize retirement in terms of health  even  when it may occur primarily for other 
reasons.  Myers (1982, 1983)  has gone so far  as  to argue that there is no useful information in 
self-evaluated health.  At the same time, for want of alternative measures, econometric analyses of 
the labor supply decisions of older men have  generally used respondents'  self-assessment  of their 
health.2  There remain important questions about the validity of self-reported measures of health 
and therefore of the inferences that can be drawn from studies that use them.  Kathryn Anderson 
and Richard Burkhauser (1984) have called the question of the appropriateness of the use of self- 
reported health measures * the major  unsettled  issue  in the empirical literature  on the labor supply 
of older workers."3 
There are a number of reasons to be suspicious of any survey response to such questions 
concerning self-evaluated health,  First, respondents are being asked for subjective judgments and 
there is no reason to expect that these judgments will be entirely comparable across respondents. 
Second, responses may not be independent of the labor market outcomes we may wish to use them 
to explain. Third, since health may represent one of the few 'legitimate' reasons for working aged 
man to be out of  work, men out of  the labor force may mention health  limitations to rationalize their 
behavior. Lastly, since early retirement benefits are often available only for those deemed incapable 
of work, men will have a financial incentive to identify themselves as disabled, an incentive that 
will be particularly high for those for whom the relative rewards from continuing to work are low. 
Each of these  problems has been noted before, but  what does not seem to have been fully 
realized is  that each will lead to different kinds of biases. The lack of comparability across indi- 
viduals represents measurement error that is likely to lead to our underestimating the impact of 
See Schwab (1974),  Reno  (1971), Sherman (1985). 
2  For example, Boskin and Hurd (1978),  Quinn (1978),  Gordon and Blinder (1981),  Diamond and Hausman 
(1983),  Hanoch  and Honig  (1983),  Burkhauser and Quinn (1983),  and Hogarth (1988) used responses  to the 
question "Does health limit the amount of kind  of work you  can perform". Burtless and MoffIt (1983  1985), 
Burtless (1986) and Gustman and Steinmeier  (1986) used responses  to a question that asks respondents  to rate 
their health in comparison  to others their age. 
It should be noted that authors cited above were well aware  of the potential problems  with using self-reported 
health measures, but used them because they were what was available. 
1 health on labor force participation.  while the endogeneity of self-reported health is likely to lead 
to our exaggerating its impact.  Biases in our estimation of health's impact on outcomes will also 
induce biases on coefficients of any variables correlated with health.  Finally the dependence of 
self-reported health on the economic environment will induce a bias on estimates of the impact 
of economic  variables on participation,  regardless of whether we correctly measure the impact of 
health itself.4 
Most work on the labor supply of older men has relied on self-reported measures of health. 
More recently a variety of authors  have argued for the use of more objective indicators of health: 
responses  to questions about specific  health conditions or  limitations, doctors'  reports or infor- 
mation on mortality.5  While such proxies are, presumably, more objective than are self-reported 
health measures, it is not clear that the use of  such proxies  will give us a more accurate indication 
of  the impact of health on labor market outcomes. As long  as these health  proxies are not perfectly 
correlated with the aspects of health that impact on economic outcomes, they will suffer from er- 
rors in variables problems. With self-reported health measures we have  biases working  in opposite 
directions and there is some chance they may tend to cancel out.  With objective measures there 
is only one bias, and, as long as the correlation between the proxy and actual health isn't close to 
perfect, the bias will be quite substantial. 
The issues  here are important for our understanding not only of the importance of health, 
but also of the impact of economic variables on early retirement.  Both subjective and objective 
health indicators are correlated with such things as education, race, pre-retirement earnings and 
pre—retirement occupation. These factors are also important  indicators of early labor market with- 
drawal.  On one interpretation  of these facts, it is the poor labor  market prospects of these men 
that induces them to leave the labor force. On another it is their health. 
The literature  that has compared results using a variety of different health  measures has tended 
to find that health  seems to play a smaller role and  economic  variables a greater one when the more 
objective proxies are used. Most authors  have interpreted these results as an indication of the biases 
inherent in using self-reported measures.6 These authors have  typically either ignored the possible 
biases inherent in the use of a proxy, or have  assumed that these biases are small in comparison to 
the ones introduced by the use of self-reported measures. 
Others have argued in favor of using self-reported information.7 These authors emphasize the 
These comments  will be made mor'e precise  shortly. 
Parsons  (1980a, 1980b, 1982), and Anderson  and Bnrkhauser (1984, 1985) used subsequent mortality inforsna- 
tion, Barilet and Taubman (1979). Bound  (1986) and Stern (1988) ssed information  on the presence  of  specific 
conditions, Chirikos and Nestel (1981, 1983) used  information  on activity limitations. 
Parsons  (5982), Anderson and Burlchauser  (1984, 1985), Chirikos and Nestel  (1981),  Lambrinos  (1981). 
See, for example,  Sickles and Taubman (1987),  Lee (1982.) 
2 flaws inherent in most objective measures of health  while pointing to the clinically oriented research 
supporting the reliability of  self-reported health  measures.8  These authors ignore the fact that even 
if self reported health is a reliable indicator of actual health, this may not be enough to guarantee 
that it  will give sensible  results when used as a proxy for health in retirement equations. At issue 
is  whether self-reported health measures are systematically biased, with those out of work being 
substantially more Likely to report health problems than those working.  Were thu the case, the use 
of self-reported measures might give misleading information on the reasons why men retire early 
ven if theses measures were highly correlated with actual health, 
An  alternative  to using either  self-reported or  more objective measures of health is to use 
'he objective measures to instrument  the subjective ones.  Stern (1988) using this methodology 
has argued that, if anything, the use of self reported health leads to underestimates of the actual 
impact of health  on labor force participation9  The limitation of  Stern's technique is that it leaves 
unidentified the impact on retirement of any factors that also directly influence men's reports on 
their  health,  In particular  this implies that in order to use  this technique to identify the impact 
on retirement  of financial incentives, one is forced to assume that men's reports on their health 
are insensitive to these incentives. If, on the other hand, self reports are, as many have thought, 
sensative to financial incentives, Stern's  technique will understate the impact of these financial 
incentives on participation. 
While there has now been a considerable literature comparing the results obtained with differ- 
ent measures of  health, there has been no consistent discussion of the statistical  matters involved in 
such comparisons. The purpose of this paper is to clarify  the issues  involved in these comparisons. 
I construct a simple statistical model that incorporates most of the issues involved. In the model, 
a self-reported measure of health is made endogenous, but is also measured with error.  A second, 
objective, health  indicator containing information on subsequent mortality, is only imperfectly cor- 
related with current health.  It turns out that, without introducing further information, the model 
is not identified. With only one objective measure of health, I am not able to simultaneously solve 
the endogeneity and measurement error problems. What the model does do is to show  quite clearly 
the potential  biases involved  in any of the above strategies together with the assumptions that are 
implicit in each.  What is more, within the context of the model it turns out  to  be  possible to 
introduce information on the reliability of self-reported measures while allowing for the kinds of 
simultaneity mentioned above. 
Studies by Nagi (1979), Maddox  and Douglas  (1973),  LaRae  et xl. (1979),  and Ferraro (1980) all find that self- 
reported health is highly correlated with medically  determined  health status  Research  by Mossey and Shapiro 
(1982) even  found  that self-reported  poor health was a slightly better  predictor of subsequent mortality than 
objectively determined health status. 
°  Havemen, Wolfe and Huang (1989), develop a model  of health as an  unobservable  using a MIMIC  framework 
that is essentially  quite similar to Stern's and come to similar conclusions. 
3 Recent literature (Krasker and Pratt (1986), Kiepper and Learner (1984)) en the use of proxy 
variables has emphasized the use of both implicit and explicit priors for bounding potential biases. 
Simple  versions of such results are well known.  Still, perhaps because researchers have believed 
that evidence on error variances is unobtainable,  this approach has rarely been  used in practice. 
instead  econometricians have generally sought exogenous inetruments  to identify models.  This 
pap.er exposits an example for which evidence on error variances does in fact exist. What is nsore, 
the obvious instrumental variable approach to the problem 
— using the objective measure of health 
to instrument the subjective one -  turns out not to be a solstion at all. 
The models developed here  build on the muitipie indicator modeling used  by Coldberger 
(1972a,b), Joreskog arid Coidberger (1975), Criliches (1974), and Chamberlain and Criliches (1975. 
19.77(,it  Unlike the above cited literature,  the health  indicators I use are all descrete. MIMIC mod 
cling has been extended to the descrete case by Mother,  (1976, 1979,  1983), Lee (1981, 1982) and 
Avery and Hots (1982:) among others. 
Toe rest of toss paper  is organized as fobows:  In. section 2, 1 outbne a simple statistical  nsodel 
that wsil guide both nor discussion and cstim.ation, In section 2. for expositional convenience, I 
1mm the fart that we observe only descrete indicators ol either retirement or healtb status and 
work as sf we actually observed their iatent counterparts.  In section 3. I discuss issues of estimation 
ah.nvring how to. take explicit account of the discrete nature of the various indicators.  Section 4 
iiios.trates them  issuer using data drawn from the Itetirement History Survey.  A brief conclusion 
2.  A  Statistical Model 
Coosidcr a simn.nic model of tbo labor sonoi.y of nid.::r  n,oo. 11w choice of whether to continue 
br individual I during tim.a period t de'oonda oo  th.e relative rewards of doing an,  us0, 
':c.oP'iovo  heaitb rtate.s b. and. oths:c randnmncnrononc-atr 
hit  '0y- + c1'n0 + 0n. 
U, the empirical a.pnoca.tmnn  a ma-s,aoco of permanent income and demographic information vail 
ho included s.e c.nrra ex.pianatory variables. A man continues to work so long am ILl passes some. 
threshold.  We exnect  to be positive.  Sfr.ce 'On  is  unobserved, the  sign nf A is arhitrary, hot 
if' lasger ashes  of m are associated with better health then we would expect that.  1'm  should be 
pcnltivo as well, 
Mc' also have a second indicator of ,,  med' reported heaTh.,  Js7.  /s1 dapends on nealth status 
o, but also on the economic rewards for co.n.tinoing to work, up,, and, again  on  other random 
15  See  Aigser, Esiac,  itapreya and Weasbeek  (iCali  for a review. 
4 components q,.. Dropping the ii subscript for notational convenience, 
= 2W + A2i7 + €, 
A man  reports  himself limited in his ability to work (or in poor health) if k tails  bellow some 
threshold.  We expect both  and ,\ to be positive. 
I assume that i  is orthogonal to both  and 2 but, as long as  there are common unobserved 
romponents  that affect both h and 1f. as there will  be if the two are definitiona.lv related or if 
health limitations act as a rationalization for retirement, e and e2  will be positiveiy correiated. 
As long an i and  w are  positively correlated, ignoring q in estimating eqeation  will iad 
to overestimates of the importance of  economic incentives in determining labor force participation. 
The obvious alternative  would we to use  as a proxy for r but there are a variety of econometrtc 
problems with doing so.  The correlation between ej and c introduces a simultaneity bias while 
variance in e introduces errors-in-variables biases on ). Errors in estimates of .k, translate into 
errors in estimates of j3, while the dependence of h  on w introduces and additional bias on 3,. 
In particular,  treating 1f  and h  as if they were observable, letting r,,,,. represent the correlation 
between q and w, and p the correlation between e and e2, and normalizing )t, to equal 1, 1 show 
in appendix 1 that: 
-  A,cr(1 
—  + a1c,2p  puns i  = 
— r,,,)  + a 
plirn  = /3, + (\  — plim A1) 
— plirn A1j32 
As  long  as  p > 0,  this correlation will impart an upward bias on ,,  while  will  impart the 
standard  errors-in-variables downward bias on A. Which one dominates depends on whether p 
is greater or less than )i, on whether i  or E2 has a greater 'impact' on 1f. The bias on /3  will 
depend both on the bias on .Xs  and on /32. Thus, it is perfectly possible that even  were the errors- 
in-variables and the simultaneity biases on  As  to cancel, we might still tend  to under-estimate 
The above expressions make clear that the biases on A,  and /3s  may be quite substantial even 
when h  is a reliable measure of ij1 (even when o  is quite small).  In fact,  other things equal. 
the more reliable is self-reported health (the smaller is a), the greater  will be the bia.s'2  They 
By the reliability  of a measure I will mean the degree to which the measure reflects  the construct that it is 
meant to. In the testing literature the term would be  "construct validity"  rather than reliability.  As a measure 
of the reliability  of an indicator I will use the correlation between  the indicator and the unobserved  construct 
it is meant to measure. 
12  This statement is obviously  not true in the limit. In the limit  €2 wow p = 0 an pumA, = 
5 also make clear that the magnitude and even the direction of the bias depends on multiple pieces 
of information.  It is not good enough to know that self-reported health is  highly  correlated with 
actual health to know that estimates using it  as a pruxy fur health  will give reliable results.  Nor, 
on the other hand, is it enough  that self-reported health may he used to justify retirement  or that 
men's reports on their health are responsive to the economic  rewards to working to establish that 
the use of self reports will exaggerate the role of health.  Priors about the kind of bias involved 
using self-reported health as a proxy for actual health implicitly involve simultaneous judgments 
about all these factors. 
Now consider a somewhat more complete model where we have  added  an equation to make 
explicit the correlation between to and q and have one more indicator of disability statns, the date 
of death d* 13 
1f=A,q+sw+c,  (1) 




In this model health, q, has two components, one of which, u, influences both longevity and work 
capacity (e.g., heart problems), while the other, p, influences  only work capacity (e.g., arthritis)." 
The C's are assumed to be uncorrelated with either the other right hand  side variables or with 
or its components v and p.  es  is  assnmed to be uncorrelated with either q, E or €4.  These 
assumptions imply that €4 is also unorrelated with either q or €3.  Lastly, v and p are assumed to 
be uncorrelated with each other.'5 
d* is objective in two ways that /C is not: C does not depend on to nor is €3 correlated with 
c. Still, as long as the date of death is not perfectly correlated with a man's capacity to work, 
using it as a proxy for health will not adequately control for health.  In particular, normalizing A3 
to equal 1, 1 show in appendix 1 that: 
13  Since,  in the empirical work, I obeerve the date of death only for those who die during the sample period, I 
will treat date of death aa lateot along with the other indicators of health status. 
The implicit assumption imbedded  in the various  components  formuiatioo (  = u +  ji) is that up to factors of 
proportionality, f]. and .,  v and  enter the labor force, health and compensation equations with identical 
coefficients.  This assumption  would seem  a natural one if we are  thiokiog of vj  as capacity for work,  and h' 
as  a self-report on this capacity.  What is  more, as the reader will see, allowing  for two kinds of health, r' and 
p  pushes identification  as it is. Without more health indicators, relaxing the variance component  formulation 
would destroy all hope of identification. 
15 This assumption  is mostly definitional.  p is the piece of q that is uncnrrelated  with C. 
6 o'2(1—r5  ) 
plim Aj = A1 (1— r)+ 
purrs i3 =  + (A1 
— plim A)—-  A1—-- 
As  long a there are disabling conditions that  are not life threatening (e.g., severe back problems, 
mental illness) controlling for d will still leave a left-out-variable bias on  while as long  as 
current capacity for work does not perfectly predict date of death there will be errors-in-variables 
biases on  both A1 and 3i. 
With two indicators of r we might be tempted to use one to instrument the other, but in this 
ase tins won't work. As long as  0 using d* to instrument h will purge h  of its dependence on 
c and so will correctly estimate A516 but will tend to underestimate l3 by 2A1.  The instrumental 
variable procedure uses the projection of h  onto is' and d  as a proxy for '1,  What we need, instead, 
is the projection of ij on w and d. With h as the dependent variable, the estimated  coefficient 
on us will reflect not only the errors in d but also w's direct effect on 1z, fl. This, in turn, will 
induce the downward bias on  of/132A1. We could sort all this out if we were to have a consistent 
estimate of  bat this requires either knowledge of the reliability of d as a proxy for r or another 
indicator of i. 
To summarize, simply using mortality information as a health proxy will tend to underesti- 
mate the effects of health and overestimate the effects of economic variables on  the labor force 
participation decision. In contrast, using mortality information to instrument self-reported disabil- 
ity status will  tend to correctly estimate  the impact  of health but  underestimate the impact  of 
economic  variables on such decisions. Finally, simply using self-reported health status  can either 
over or underestimate the impact of either health or economic variables on such decisions. 
Without more information either in terms of variables (another indicator of q that does not 
depend on either w or s) or prior restrictions on some parameters the model is unidentified. This 
is most clearly  seen if we exaxnine  the variance-covariance  matrix implied by the model: 
This  result depends on  the assumption that  has been  normalized  to equal  one.  What  will  always  be 
consistently estimated is 
iS' On the other hand, we cannot use  as an instrument for d  since  h  is correlated with e1. 
7 [A -I- ,3t.A4['c + '?°L + 
[A, + /3,A4][A, + /3,A41c  + Ø,I3sa, + pC,C,2  [A,  il,A4]'c + fic?, + o, 
[A1 + j3,A4[A,c  [A2 + Ø,A4[A,a  Aga + c 
[A,  [A,+,As[Asa+fi,c,  A4A,a  Acg+c, 
lf  C  w 
'3/ith four  observables  we have  10  independent  variances and covariances,  but'  13 independent 
parameters to estimate (4 A's, 4 a's, 2 's4, c, and p).  Since  sj  is unobserved we are free to 
use one of  these parameters  as a normaliration  to fix the scale of p.  What is more, it is easy to see 
that most of  the parameters of  interest depend only on the magnitude  of the cuvariance between p 
and C, A,o, not on the components of this covariance.  Thus,  we can reparameterize  the model 
in terms of this covariance with little loss.'8  Still we are left with one too many parameters  to 
estimate. 
We can get somewhat further if we are willing to say something about the reliability  of h  as 
a proxy for p.  What  we noted above was that in the presence of correlated  measurement  error, 
knowing the reliability of  self reported health was not enough to allow us to identify the effect of 
health on retirement  behavior.  But within the 4-equation system we have explicitly  accounted for 
the interdependencies between self-reported  health and retirement.  Information  on the reliability 
of h, of C, or even of the relative reliability of the two are now enough  to identify  the system. 
The extra indicator of health, C, givee us the leverage we need to be able to use information  on 
the reliability  nf h. 
3.  Issues of Estimation 
So far, moatly for expoaitional convenience, I have  acted as if I had continuous measures of 
each of  the dependent  variables, but this is not the case. I  have dichotomous indicators of  whether 
an individual  is in the labor force or whether they report health limitations  on their ability to 
work and a polychotemoue indicator  of mortality.  Thus it is not literally  possible to simply, for 
example, use C as a proxy for p or as an instrument for h'. The common solotion to this problem 
is to substitute the available dummy  indicators for their continuous latent counterparts. Thus, for 
example, a dummy  variable indicating  the presence of  health limitations,  /s, would be substituted 
for fi* or dummy indicators for the date of death would be substituted for C. 
More precisely, parameterizing the model in terms  of A5s implies that we canoes separately identify 033 hot 
otherwise leaves the model anchasged. 
8 Though this procedure may be convenient and appropriate for many purposes, it is not for our 
own. Mea.surement error for indicator variables is more problematic than it s  for continuous ones. 
The lid normal assumption no longer makes any sense, with multiple indicators (of, for example, 
the date of death) we would  have to account for the interdependence of these rrors, and implicit 
no'-malizations will change  as we move across specifications. 
As  an  alLernativ' we can  model h and d  as explicitly endgnous. estimating rhree semi- 
reduced form specifications with 1f, h  and d  as dependent variables, and recover the parameters 
of interest from the estimated  reduced form parameters.  This strategy  is in line with the recent 
literature  on estimating simultaneous limited dependent variable models using two stage methods'9. 
Take for example, the case where we want to use  as a proxy for  mj.  Estimating such an equation 
by OLS is equivalent to first estimating reduced forms for 1f and h: 
1f  =mr,w + U1 
h  =ir,w + U5 
OLS  estimates of A, and 3, can be obtained as: 
ci 
A,  = 
cY, 
=  — 
Even if we observe only descrete indicators of 1f or  we can still, subject to two extra normal- 
izations, estimate (1') and (2') and derive the OLS estimates of A,  and /3, from the reduced form 
estimates of ,r1, 2 and 
To estimate (1) using dC rather than h as a proxy for q follows similar lines. We first estimate 
a reduced form for d: 
= r3w + u3 
The OLS estimates of /3, and A,  are then: 
A, =. 
= *5  — 
In a similar way, to estimate (1) by using h to proxy i, but then instrumenting h  with d amounts 
to using all three reduced from equations.  Here we have: 
See Newey  (19s7) for a review. 
9 0142,143 
= r5 — 
For the general case it will he helpful to introduce a bit more notation.  Write 1)  as  -yin + V 
where y =  and v is orthogonal to in by construction, and write v as r-yw + e where r  4 
and E is orthogonal to w by construction.  The reduced form r's can be rewritten in terms of the 
the 0's, 7 and r: 
= A  + fl 
= A2  + 
= A3ry 
while the reduced form  errors, the u's, can be written in terms of the A's, the L's,  V and e 
u5 =A1v + q 
3  A3V + €3 
it3 211A3 + €3 
and a residual covariance matrix: 
Ao + o 
A1A2o +pa,,o,3  Aa +o 
A5A3o  A1A3c  Ao+o 
c, equals o{l 
— 4J and c equals ro[1 
— 
This  "reduced form" representation of the model can be estimated  even if we observe only 
discrete indicators of If , h  and de. Assuming the u's are jointly normally distributed,  the model 
is a trivariate  probit. As is standard,  we can estimate the ir's only up to a scale factor, but otherwise 
everything else goes through- As long as the model  in question is exactly identified one can then 
solve for the structural parameters in terms of the reduced form estimates.  Standard errors can 
be obtained using the so-called delta method.2° The various estimation  strategies outlined above 
For overidentified  models, she structural parameters can be obtained from the reduced forms  using minimum 
x2 procedures (see Ferguson,  1958).  In particular let 9 be  the  vector of reduced form  parameters and 5 be  the 
vector of structural parameters. Estimation  of the reduced from gives us estimates of both 9 and the variance 
covariance-  matrix of 9, V(9).  Then each of our models implies  that f(S) = 9, where f  is a known function 
(that depends on the model). Mininsem  x2 methods  estimate S by minimisiag the quadratic form: 
10 correspond to different restrictions on the various parameters of the model. If h  is used as a proxy 
for q the parameters of  interest are exactly identified within the first two equations by setting both 
u sod a, to 0.  If d  is  used as a proxy for q the parameters are exactly identified within the 
first and third equation by setting c  to 0.  When we use C as an instrument for h, the model is 
exactly identified only if we use all three equations.  Here estimates are derived by setting .2 = 0. 
Alternatively, we can explicitly introduce outside information to identtfy the model,  For ex 
ample, we might introduce information on the reliabihty with which either C or C refloct  the 
capacity to  work  to fix either  fl2  or r.\3.  Alternatively, if we had some informat,on about the 
relative rehability of 4  aod C we could also use this information. 
4.  Implementation 
Data to ostimate the abose model  is drawn from the Retirement History Survey (RHS,i. The 
RIIS  followed a nationally representative sample of 8131 men21 aged 58.ri3 in the base year for 10 
years 19691979. Information was collected on. among oher things. respom.dents' work  lives, their 
pension eligibility and their health. Respondents were matched to their social security records and, 
for those who died during the interview years, information is available on their date of death.22  As 
of 1969, 14.5% of the men reported that they were fully  retired while another  8.1% reported that 
they were partially retired.  75% of those fully  retired and 53% of  those partially retired identified 
health as the reason  for their retirement. 
I will focus my attention on the labor force participation decision  as of the 1969 survey week 
and  will  restrict my attention  to those who were either  currently working in or whose primary 
affiliation had been the private sector.23  The RHS survey included two different questions asking 
respondents to evaluate their overall health:  "Does health limit the amount or kind of work you 
can do?" and "Is your health better, worse, or the same as that of  other people your age?". I report 
results using each.24  For a more objective measure of health, I use the information on the date 
The varianre covaciance matrix fsr these estimates is just: 
11'T vy'i Prt 
With exactly identified  models it may be  simpler  to just solve  for 5  (6 = f''(°l) and the use the so called 
delta method to derive standard errors. In practice I  used  both  methods,  one as a check on the other. 
25  Unmarried  women  were also followed,  but we will restrict attention to the men. 
22  The mortality information  comes from the  Social  Security's records.  Available  evidence  suggests  that these 
records  are highly  reliable  (see Sickles and Taubman for a discussion  of this issue.  The mortality data.  was 
kindly provided  by Kathryn Anderson  and Richard Bnrkhauser. 
23  While I  have information  on men's social security earnings and can therefore  calculate potential social security 
benefits,  I do not have  comparable  information  for those working in the public sector 
24  As  long  as one allows the two self-reported health measures to be  freely  correlated, the extra self-reported 
health measure  does not ald in identification. The extra measure  of health adds one reduced  form a and three 
reduced  from  cross  equation correlations, hot adds an equal number of parameters, a A, a /3, and  two cross 
equation  correlations. 
11 of death.  For economic variables I use the individuals' social security earning history to calculate 
measures of  permanent  income  together with measures of the total compensation from continuing 
to  work  for another year.  Following  Burkhauser (1979, 1980)  1  calculate three components to 
compensation: 1) annual earnings, 2) the change in the present discounted value of  expected social 
security benefits and 3) the change in the present discounted value of pension benefits. The detalls 
of how I constructed both the lifetime income and total compensation variables are contained in 
appendix 2.  For demographic variables I used age as of 1969, marital status, race and educational 
attainment. 
For estimation I restricted the sample to men who were or had been employed in the private 
sector and who had complete data on items used in estimation. The final sample size was 6022.25 
Sample statistics together with variable definitions are reported in Table 1.  82% of the sample were 
in the labor force as of the survey, 35% reported health limitations on tlseir ability to work while 
20% reported being in worse health than other men their age. 
As shown  in Table 2, 27.7% of the sample had died by 1979.  Of thoee who died within two 
years of the survey, more than two-thirds report health limitations on their ability to work, while 
more than half  report being in poor health.  Over 45% were out of the labor force, This contrasts 
with those who were still alive at the end of the survey. Of  these, roughly one quarter report health 
limitations on their ability to work, 15% report being in poor health  wbile 14% are out of  the labor 
force. There  is a clear pattern of association between mortality and our other indicators of health 
status, but the 'fit' is far from perfect. 
Table 3 reports estimates of the effects of compensation, lifetime income  and the demographic 
factors on the probability that a respondent will be in the labor force as of the  1969 survey week, 
will report health limitations on his ability to work, will report himself in poor health or will die 
during the sample period.  Date of death (d) is polychotomous, with seven categories ordered so 
that higher values are associated with a later death (e.g., 7 denotes alive in 1979, 6  died between 
1974 and  1979,  5 died in  1973, etc.). Limit (1), health (h) and labor force participation (If) are 
dichotomies, 0-1 variables with I's representing no health  limitations, health  as good or better than 
average and participation respectively,  while log(wage) and Iog(incosne) represent the natural log 
of  annual compensation and permanent income respectively. Other exogenous variables included in 
the specification are the age of the respondent, his educational attainment,  his race and his marital 
status.  The coefficients  on Iog(wage) imply that those men who would be well compensated for 
staying in the work force another year are more likely to do so but are also less likely to report 
health limitations on their ability to work, are less likely to report being in poor health and more 
25  Eliminating  those not employed  in the  private sector eliminated 1655 men, insisting that a man's discounted 
lifetime earnings be  above $100 and that his annual salary be above $iee  eliminated 12 men,  while  426 had 
bad data of some kind or another. 
12 likely to survive the sample  period.  Age lowers the probability that a man will be working while 
raising the probability that he will suffer health limitations or will die during the sample period. 
The other demographic variables have their expected effects. More educated and married men arc 
more likely  to work, but  are  less likely  to report health limitations ur to die  during the sample 
period. 
Estimated correlations across the equations are also reported.  All corr°lations are positive  as 
expected  The correlation botween either self- reported nealth  limitations or poor health aod labor 
force withdrawal is very strong (.7ll7  and .717), with the correlation between  date of  death and the 
other indicators being relatively weak. In particular, the relatively weak correlations between date 
of death and either self reported health limitations or labor force status suggest that mortality itself 
nsay not be that highly correlated with current disability status. F  his should not he  very surprising 
The most common kinds of health  conditions associated with self-reported disability are ncuscuio- 
skeletal (e.g., arthritis) and these will, in general, not  be life threatening.  Moreover,  the leading 
causes of death amnng men in this age range, heart disease and cancer, often nsanifest themselves 
only shortly before death.  Lastly we note that, cuntsary to some researchers impressions, there 
seems to be very little difference between the two self-reported health measures.  Log(wuge) does 
seem to have somewhat stronger impact on self-reported health limitations than on self-reported 
poor health, suggesting that the endogeneity problem may be greater for the former variable, but 
the differences are nut large and the cross equation correlation patterns  are almost identical. 
The estimates  reported in Table 3 will be the basis for our estimation of the factor model, but 
it may be worthwhlie to first consider some more standard  estimates of the impact of health and the 
replacement rate on labor force participation.  Table 4 reports  various  such estimates.  Column I 
reports estimates with no controls for health status. The coefficient of .193 on annual compensation 
corresponds to an elasticity of non-participation with respect to compensation (evaluated at the 
sample proportion) of a substantial  .28.  The specifications reported in columns 2 and 3 include 
measures of self-reported health.  These two indicator variables both have a very strong negative 
impact on participation, while the coefficient on log(wage) drops by between 42% and 61%. Column 
4 replaces self-reported health with six indicators of the date of death.  These pick up significant 
coefficients but, judging by the values of the log-likelihood  statistics for the various models, have 
nothing  like the impact on participation that the self-reported measures do. The impact of including 
the mortality indicators on the estimated effect compensation is negligible, 
There are two prpblems with the kinds of specifications reported in Table 4.  First, since the 
units  in which the health  proxies  are measured change, it is hard to  make  comparisons across 
specifications of  the implied impact  of health on participation.  Furthermore each specification 
implies something different about the measurement errors involved in the proxies.  To compare the 
impact of health  acrnss specifications  we would  need to take this unmeasured component of health 
13 into account. This is more easily done in the context of the explicit factor model outlined in the 
preceding section. 
Table 5 reports six sets of estimates of the labor forre participation equation (1), but with the 
estimates now based on the estimates reported in Table 3.  We normalize c., a?.., o.,, cr. and 
to be 1.  With these normalizations A1 and A2 can be interpreted as the correlation between  sj and 
the two dependent variables while A3r  is can be interpreted  as the correlation between s and d. 
Choosing a normalization that remains constant  across  specifications facilitates the comparison of 
the impact of health on participation.26 
Column 1  reports the 'OLS' estimates of /3k:  the effect  of log(wage) on participation  that 
ignores  the effect  of health.  The estimate  simply  rescales to take account of the change in the 
normalization (from c, = 1 to °?f =  1.)  the comparable one in table 4 and  is  reported  as  a 
baseline. Columns 2 through 4 report estimates that use d and then either 1  or 4* as proxies  for 
sj, while columns 5 and 6 report estimates where d  is used to instrument l  or 4*  Using d* as a 
proxy for p lowers the estimate of  /3s  by just 15%.  Using 1 or  as the proxy for p dramatically 
lowers the estimates of j3 to essentially 0, and more than doubles the estimates of A1.  Whether 1 
of  fi* is used makes very little difference for the estimates of  A5, but using 1  does produce somewhat 
lower estimates of /lj. Again we see the suggestion that endogeneity is more of a problem with 1 
than 45, but the differences  aren't large.  The estimates of A5 suggest that, among men this age, 
the variation in health  across individuals can explain 50% of the variation in labor  force behavior.27 
Finally, using d  to instrument 1 or 4' lowers the estimates of $ and raises the estimates of A1 
still further. 
The disparities in the three sets of estimates reported in Table 5 are enormous.  The results 
using the mortality information provide a lower bound on the impact of health on retirement while 
providing an upper bound on the impact of compensation on retirement. On the other hand, using 
the mortality information to instrument the self-reported measures gives us upper bounds on the 
impact of health and lower bounds on the impact of compensation. 
In Tables 6, I take a different  tack.  Estimates for the full model are presented under various 
assumptions about the magnitude of A2.  At one extreme  we have the case where  A3 = 1 which 
amounts to simply  proxying health with mortality. At the other extreme we have the case where 
/32 = 0 which amounts to instrumenting self reported health with the mortality information. When 
1  is used, estimates  with /2 = 0 imply estimates of Ps,.€2  that are outside the unit circle.  Alternative 
estimates with Pc,,ez set equal to -1 are also reported.  Lowering  A2 raises the estimates of  /ls  and 
26  It is worth noting  that these normalizations are not the standa.rd  ones.  Using j*  •  or C as proxies  for , 
would typically  involve normalizing  either A2 or A3 to equal one, while using  C to instrument  either  1' or 
would  typically  involve normalizing  A2 to equal one. 
27 Recall that A1 can be  interpreted as the correlation between s aod If'. Thus A? = R,11_.  .712 =  .511 and 
.722 = .52. 
14 2, while lowering the estimates of At and  A3.  Varying A3 would  produce a similar pattern. Here, 
lowering  A3  would lower the estimates of $j and $ while raising the estimates  of At  and A2. 
To narrow  the range  of estimates we need to introduce more information. First, it wauid seem 
pausihle 'hat 1  would  oe at least as correlated with  tj as d  would  be.  After all, the primacy 
objection to the 1  was not that it was poorly correlated  with  q, but that E was correlated with 
q. lt would  also 0cetn plausible that compensation should base a positive impact on partIcipation. 
Imposing the testriction  that  A2 ￿  A3r  and  that 'it  U  tightens the feasible  range over the 
parameter space to the middle rectangles in Table 6. 
I'o get still forthcr we can explicitly''ntroduce information from some of the reliability studies 
mentioned in the it.troduction.  Most of the studies cited above were done on older individuals and 
it ,e unclear how wei results generalize to a working aged  0opulation.  Perhaps the 3tody that is the 
most appropriate for our purpose is the one by Nagi (1979). Nagi, using a sample of  older working 
aged  men,  compared their reports of physical limitations  to those  of attending physicians.  He 
compared doctors' reports to self reports along a number of dimensions including the capacity for 
work.  The polychoric correlation between respondents' and doctors' reports implied by this stody 
is .53 (.00)25 Thus, even if we took the doctors' reports of capacity to work as completely accurate, 
the correlation between self-assessments  and actual health would be .53. Should we assume that 
the doctors are no more accurate than the individuals themselves, but that the errors in the iwo 
reports are independent, we get a correlation of about  ,y,29  Thus  it is unclear how well the Nagi 
results can be generalized to the RIIS  sample. What is more, it is unclear whether our resalts can 
be generalized either to other  age groups or other time periods.  The reliability with which with 
self-reported health or mortality information indicates capacity for work could easily he a function 
of both age and cohort. 
Given the normalization a  1,  A2  is equal  to the correlation between ,  and 1.  Thus, 
estimates  of the correlation between  1  and 'T translate  directly into estimates of A3 that can then 
be imposed to resolve the identification issue. Table 6 shows that a correlation of .53 comes close 
to reproducing the results where A2 = A3r.  A correlation  near .7 implies an estimate of fit of .06 
and an estimate of A9 of .6. 
It may he worthwhile to turn hack for a while to the issue of  whether self-reported or objective 
measures of health give more accurate estimates  of the impact of either health of compensation 
25  Nagi had both doctors and the older men themselves  rate their capacity to work on a six point scale and reports 
the resnlting 5 by S table.  To calculate the correlation  between  the two  reports I assumed that the scales 
represented descrete indicators of  underlying  latent variables  and estimated the implied correlation between 
these latent factors by maximum-likelihood.  See Olsson (1979). 
25  A few cautions are probably in order. Nsgi's study was based not on a random sample of the population but 
so referrals  from physicians  and clinics.  se% reported some  kind of work limitations. While we would normally 
think that truncating on a variable  should  reduce the correlation  between this variable  and others,  the fact 
that all the men in Nagi's sample had recently  been involved  with some clinic or rehabilitation serstce might 
have  an impact on the accuracy  with which  these  men reported on their capacity for work. 
15 of retirement behavior,  Whether we impose the restrictions that  A2 ￿  A3r and  that  ￿  0 or 
take the Nagi results as some kind of  indication about plausible magnitudes for A2 we come to the 
conclusion that the use of the mortality information as a proxy for health exagerates the impact 
of economic factors and underestimates the impact of health by substantial  margins. We also see 
pretty clear signs that the use of self reported health limitations exagerates the impact of health 
on participation  and biases the estimates of economic  factors downward.  This is the conclusion we 
reach comparing estimates using health  limits to those using bad health or by simply noting that 
when health limits is used  is of the 'wrong' sign.  The Nagi results suggest that self-reported 
health measures lead to estimates  that exaggerate the impact of health and underestimates the 
impact of  economic factors on retirement  by substantial margins. What  these results would  seem 
to do is to question any presumption in favor of  either the objective or the self reported measures 
of health.  They also suggest that procedures that amount to instrumenting self-reported health 
with objective measures are likely to give results that are even more misleading than the ones that 
'naively' use the self-reported measures themselves. 
Conclusion 
Various authors have  used 'objective' rather than self-reported indicators of health status in 
the estimation  of labor  force participation  equations.  Typically such proxies  yield results that 
suggest that health  plays a smaller role and economic  variables a larger  one than estimates based 
on self-reported measures would suggest.  We have  seen that there is another interpretation  of 
this pattern.  Proxies commonly used, such as the date of subsequent mortality, are bound to be 
imperfectly correlated with health status. Even a moderate amount of measurement error in such 
proxies can easily lead to the conclusion that the self-reported measure will give a more accurate 
picture of the impact of health and financial incentives on labor supply. 
The search for 'objective' or exogenous  indicators of health status may have  been a bit mis- 
placed.  For example, even if we were to have information from physical exams available, using 
these alone in retirement  or labor force equations would not eliminate the biases involved.  We 
could always imagine that there were conditions or circumstances not included in the examination 
that would in some circumstances imply that an individual was unable to work.  Perhaps more 
importantly, results from physical exams would  not control for the specific demands of a person's 
job environment or the interaction between a person's skifis and his health  limitations.  Moreover, 
the severity of certain medical conditions (e.g., pain) are impossible to measure through objective 
tests.3° Part of the problem with 'objective' measures of health is that they measure health rather 
than capacity for work. As a result, information on the reliability of  these measures can ultimately 
never be informative about the validity of these measures as proxies for work capacity. 
30  Were reliable objective measures  of work capacity available,  we wouldn't see the kind  of controversy that we 
do surrounding  the medical  screening that individuals  go through to qualify for disability benefits. 
16 On the other hand, self-reports of  health limitations, while being direct measures  of the capacity 
to work, suffer from a host of other problems.  Most importantly,  if men rationalize retirement 
decisions made for other reasons by identifying themselves as incapable of work or in poor health, 
self reported  measures of health are likely to exaggerate the importance of health in retirement 
decisions. What is  more, the significance attributable to health may mask the effect  of economic 
variables. 
While these issues have been widely  recognized,  most researchers have approached the issue by 
presuming that the errors-in-variables problems inherent in the use of obertivc measures of health 
is small in comparison to the endogeneity problems inherent in the use of self reported measures. 
Yet, what informs this presumption is does not get spelled out.  More recently, several  researchers 
have  combined information on self-reported and more objective measures of health  by  using the 
objective measures to instroemnt the self-reported ones. While this procedure would sem to have 
much appeal,  we have seen that it will tend to underestimate the impact of economic  variables on 
retirement.  In fact, the empirical results reported in table 5 suggest that using objective measures 
to instrument  subjective ones may actually exacerbate the biases that occur -when self-reported 
measures are used alone. 
In this paper I have constructed a simple statistical model that incorporates information from 
both self-reported and objective measures of health.  What this model makes clear is that  even 
with these multiple indicators of health status, the impact of health on labor force participation 
is not identified.  Without  further information it is not  possible to determine whether objective 
or self reported measures of health give more accurate indications of the importance of health  in 
determining retirement behavior.  In the final section of the paper I suggest ways of introducing 
outside information into the model to help resolve the identification problem.  Results using this 
auxilory information suggests that both the errors-in-variables problem associated with the objec- 
tive measures of health and the endogeneity problem associated with the self-reported  measures are 
substantial. What  is more, combining information from both sources by instrumenting self-reported 
measures of health with the objective measures can make things  worse. 
At the pragmatic level, these results suggest that neither objective nor self-reported health 
measures can be counted upon to provide reliable  estimates of the impact of health  or other variables 
on  the labor force attachment  of older men. On a more positive note, the results do suggest that 
objective and self reported measures lead to biases in opposite directions. Thus, results using both 
can be used to bound nit the actual effect of health and other factors on labor force behavior. 
17 Appendix 1: Derivation of Potential Bias's Using Different Proxies for Health 
In this appendix I will derive the bias formulas asserted in section 2 of the text. 
Recall the equation system: 
Lf*=A?l+13+  (1) 
h=A2i7+32w+e2  (2) 
d=?3v+e3  (3) 
W  = .A4'7 + C4 
= v+p 
I assume that both 17 and w  are uncorrelated with the c's, that both  and c4  are uncorrelated 
with either Ej, c2 or each other,  but allow  and c to be correlated with each other and denote 
this correlation p.  Finally, I assume that p and v are uncorrelated with each other and with the 
Before proceeding it will help to introduce some additional notation: Write t7 as -yw + v, v as 
w+E and p as y,.w+(. y  a., , -  and y,.  while v,  and (are all orthogonal to 
w.  Note that the 0 correlation between v and p implies  that  = ,  while o = c(1 
— 
= ô(1 
—  and  = o(1 
— 
Substituting  for '  and v: 
1f  = [A11 + Iltlw + [)qv  c,j 
= 2tjW + tLj 
h  = [A2  + 1321w + fA2v + (2] 
=  1,2W + tL2 
= [A3-y,]w + [A3e + E3] 
= 1r3w + 153 
The various  estimates of  and  A1 can be written in terms of the lr's  and the covariances 
between the u's. In particular,  using h  as a proxy for 17 gives: 
18 = 1 — 
Usiug (L  55  4.  POXY  for rj gives: 
•  a 
A1  = 
= 1 — 
Using 1s  as a proxy for i, but instrumenting with d gives: 




Writing out the probability limits of these estimates we have: 
Using h' as  a proxy  for  q: 
For A1: 
-  -  pltin a. 
pulls A5 =  a 
— ____________ 
A3a+a 
Normalizing A1  to equal 1 and substituting for a  we get: 
-  A1o(l  rU) + cr55o2p 
pltmA1= 
o(1  r)+a 
For  /li: 
pliin /5  — pil  SI:  — IiII  57 plim  A1 
=  /J (A 
— puss: A1)7 
— plim A1132 
=  -L (A1 
— pun: A1 )" 
— plirn A132 
19 Using d  as a proxy  for 7/: 
For A1: 
p1/rn  U) 
plnn A1  = 
p/tm 0/, 
—  AA3a 
A3ae+a2 
NorrnaFzing  A3  to eqoal 1 and substitoting for a?  we get: 
a(—r3,) 
plzrn A1 = 
For jli: 
plim 1 = plirn 1 — p/sm 773  piim A1 
= Pt  p1/rn  Ai)7 + Ayy. 
= Pt + (A1  plim A1)E + 
IV osing d to instrument h*: 
For A1: 
p1zrn& 
p/tm  a1 = 
plsrn  c2, 
— AjA3a  — 
A2A3cm 
A1 
Normalizing  A1  to equal one we have: 
plirn A1 = A1 
For i/i: 
20 pliTn /3i = plim * 
— plim 2 pliTn .i 
=—/32 
=  — 
21 Appendix 2 Specification of the Retirement  Equaticn 
ts soccifying the ntirement  equatIon in this pDer I fdllowd the e:'isring  lIterature  I iwagne 
that a oar. nntinues to work so .cng as the compnsaticn fur doing so, 'c, is abocc a n's rvst-rn 
war w  al'o assame that th" iog of the reservation wage is a linear function of  the .op of tlfetime 
nrom p. realty  57. and denographcs, X  This specification results in a very  sImple  :eu'-'cen5 
o- partitipation  eqo't'on: a roar, runt'  anes to work if: 
10(a) >  r' e) -i- X'd  n  c 
7,. en-cu ate tho pr'rcnted di'rrcrnd value of iiktime earnngs i incisde torso 'o:n'  nen s: 
'h prr'ent discoucted value  of pest earnings no of tin-c t: 2, the present discount •c  valor- of 
s' cia :,scnri'y bensfi's ,v,rs the man to retire as of time :  and, 3) for those who irdi  ated ,.st 
'nuy were  ullIghls alt s psi -'at  nensten, the present doscounted value of this osnsicn as ". tn" I. 
Potal rompeorstion  is nairuletud as tie change in the pr'scnt discounted vs',se  of  fe  °- 
aer' the man  to work one snore year. 
I  focus on the participation derision in 1n59, eaicuIating  both lifetime income and c '-npe'satlon 
as if the man had continued workiog  up until that point. For my measure of  past earnings I used the 
'ocisi security earrings history. For men who were not working as of 1969 I projected foreward  their 
earnings from the year before they reported having ceased working  assuming  that these earnings 
would  hove remained constant. For men still in the work force in 1969  1  used their 196t earnings. 
The present disnounted  value of  earnings  was then calculated using the earnings history beck to 1951 
together with the prime interest rate for each year between 1951 and 1969.  Social security earning' 
are truncated at the taxable maximum, but the kITS contains information on which  quarter the 
maximum was attained.  This allowed  me to impute earnings for those above  the maximum. For 
men who were currently married their wives' earnings were included in the calcuiation. 
Social security benefits were  calculated using the 1969 law  and  assuming  the  osan  worked 
through 1968.  To calculate the present discounted value of benefits I assumed  that benefits would 
continue to  grow  with inflation (5%) and discounting assuming a nominal interest rate  of  77 
and model life tables.  For married men, I included both dependent and survivor benefits in the 
calculation. Thus, for married men the calculation is: 
PDV59 = PTA69 x  Bt[1 +  — (1 
— r,)(1 
— 
Where B represents f4, and srt,h  and srj,,,,  represent the probabilities that  the man or his wife 
survive up through time t. 
22 All respondents were asked if they would  be  eligible  for pensions benefits from their present 
or previous jobs. Those who identified themselves  as eligible for a pension were also asked at what 
age they would be eligible for full retirement benefits  .N  o information was obtained on  the kind 
of pension plan that individuals were eligible  for but tabulations from the BLSs  Level  of Benefits 
Survey show that over 80% of  those eligible for pensions are subject to some kind of  defined  benefit 
plan. Work by Lazear and Kotllkoff and Wise suggest that a salient  feature of such plans are that 
increments to pension wealth decrease at early and normal retirement ages.  This feature of such 
plans can be captured using the formula: 
F =  — r n)b  e 
where e represents the final salary.  s years of service, 8 benefits a  a fractiou of final salary pr year 
of service, r the reductiou rate for early retirement. aod u the number of years prior to  normal 
retirement age that a man retires.  e, a  and  n  are derived from survey responses  assuming that a 
man worked through 1968.  8 and r were imputed using information on the industry of  employment 
and tables 4.5.31  and 4.8.9 In Kotllkoff and Smith (1983). The present discounted value of  pension 
benefits is then calculated assumIng that benefits would remalu constant in nominal terms from 
the date of retirement using a 7% discount rate. 
To calculate total compensation for continuing to work, if a man were to continue working 
through  1969 he would  continue to earn what he did in  1968  For  those in the work force as of 
1969 this number represents their actual 1968 earnings. For men who were out of the labor force as 
of 1969 this represents earnings during the last year for which they worked.  Using  the additional 
year of  earnings I redid the present value calculation. Compensation is the difference  between  the 
present'  discounted value of  earnings, social security benefits arid pensions calculated assuming first 
that the man works through 1968 and then through 1969. 
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29 Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
variable  mean  mm  max  std 
Ln(wage)  8.80  4.63  11.59  .78 
Ln(income)  12.03  8.79  13.76  .77 
Age  60.40  58.00  63.00  1.71 
Education  9.78  0.0  18.00  3.57 
Nonwhite  .09 
Married  £8 
Pension  .42 
Good health  .35 
Poor health  .20 
Health limits work  .35 
Labor force participant .82 
Variable Definitions 
log of the total compensation for working an extra year 
(see the text for details) 
log of discounted lifetime earnings 
(see the text for details) 
age as of 1969 
educational attainment in 1969 
1 if married spouse present in 1969, 0 otherwise 
I if nonwhite, 0 otherwise 
1 if eligible for a pension in  1969; 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent,  as of 1969, reports that health limits 
his ability to work, 0 otherwise. 
1 if respondent,  as of 1969, reports that his health is  better 
than that of other men his age, 0 otherwise. 
1 if respondent,  as of 1969, reports that his health is worse 
than that of other men his age, 0 otherwise. 








health limits work 
good health 
poor health 
labor force participant 
1 Table 2;  Percent with Health Limitations in 1969 and 









% in poor 
health '69 




1969  1.2  81.9  58.3  52.8 
1970  1.9  70.4  53.0  46.1 
1971  1.7  68.3  46.5  45.5 
1972  2.9  52.6  37.1  33.1 
1973  2.9  51.7  27.3  27.3 
1974  3.2  46.4  30.4  28.9 
1975  2.9  51.7  33.7  26.2 
1976  3.1  49.5  33.0  25.0 
1977  3.2  48.4  32.3  26.0 
1978  3.5  37.9  26.1  19.0 
1979  1.1  40.0  26.2  20.0 
alive in 1979  72.3  28.7  15.4  14.1 
total  100.0  32.6  20.7  18.4 












Log of Wage  193  .294  .235  .101 
(.038)  (.031)  (.036)  (.032) 











Education  .047 
(.006 ) 
Non white  —.034 
(.069) 























Cross Equation Correlations 
Labor Force  1.00 
Health Limits  .707  1.00 
Poor Health  .717  .870  1.00 
Date of Death  .297  .337  .354  1.00 
Labor  Health  Poor  Date of 
Force  Limits  Health  Death 
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Edt. 
ilcoich Lirrots 
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4 Table 5: Parameter  Estimates Based on Reduced Forms 
Controifm 
Health  — 
[  Pasneter 
None  — 
A1n0 
Date of  aithBad 
Death  Limits  Health 
A1  2n0A2=0 
T1iealth 
Instrumented  I  instrumented 
n0 
-n1  th  .192 
(.037) 
-  550 
.163 
(.036) 
—.014  .025 
(.033)  (.033) 
— .065  .004 
(.040)  (.036) 
A  -  —__ 
.296 
22) 
.711  .719 
16)(.016) 
.876  .762  (.l 
Table 6: Estimates Based on Various Assumptions about A5 
Heallh Limits 
A2  i3  Aj  A3 
.334  .163  .257  .296  1.000  .675 
.4  .150  .242  .354  .835  .659 
.5  .125  .215  .443  .669  .624 
.579  .103  .190  .513  .579  .584 
.6  .096  .182  .532  .559  .571 
.7  .062  .144  .620  .481  .486 
.8  .023  .099  .709  .422  .330 
.852  .000  .024  .755  .397  .187 
.9  -.022  .049  .377  -.033 
.953  -.029  .128  .810  .371  -1.000 
.989  -.065  .000  .876  .344  —  -1.786 
Bad HroW 
Az  s  A1  A3r  pI 
.352  .163  .198  .296  1.000  .685 
.4  .154  .188  .336  .881  .675 
.5  .132  .162  .420  .706  .645 
.595  .108  .132  .499  .595  .602 
.6  .106  .131  .503  .590  .600 
.7  .075  .094  .587  .507  .529 
.8  .040  .052  .671  .445  .407 
.9  .000  .004  .755  .397  .140 
.908  -.004  .000  .762  .393  .103 
5 